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The article presents the relational, socio-cultural approach to populism, also referred to by some as "performative". The approach claims phenomenological validity cross-regionally and is complex enough to provide a theory of populism and its subjective logic, while minimal enough to be used handily by other scholars. Populism is not a set of decontesting ideas or "ideology", but a way of being and acting in politics, embodying in discourse and praxis the culturally popular and "from here", in an antagonistic and mobilizational way against its opposite, together with personalism as a concrete mode of authority. Defined in the most synthetic way, populism is the flaunting of what I typologically call the "low". I also argue that civilizational projects of different kinds create a distasteful "unpresentable other"; populists then claim that this Other is nothing less than the true Self of the nation, its "authentic" people, disregarded in that process. Relatedly, the article introduces the general populist scheme of contending forces, present cross-regionally and in left as well as right populisms, with "the people" facing a three-way coalition: a nefarious minority Otherized; global forces strongly playing in favor of it; a government in line with that minority or alliance. Populism extolls the national pleb "as is" and promise to reconcile the nation with itself by making the plebs the whole. The cultural component of populism should be domesticated by political scientists, since it has deep roots in cleavage formation theory, the sociology of distinction, and updated Gramscian and Weberian sociopolitical analyses.

La transformation de la configuration du système de partis chilien d'une dynamique compétitive entre trois blocs idéologiques le long d'un éventail gauche-droite étendu (1958-1973) à une compétition inégale entre deux grands blocs sur un espace gauche-droite plus réduit depuis la fin des années 1980 assure la stabilité politique de l'arène politique chilienne post-transition. Deux aspects sont déterminants ici : le lieu des frontières entre blocs politico-institutionnels et un nouvel ancrage du système de partis sur une portion étendue (le centre et le centre-gauche) de l'éventail politique. Les diverses stratégies de lutte contre la dictature de Pinochet donnèrent lieu à un remaniement substantiel de ces frontières et à un changement conséquent dans les rapports de force interblocs. Cette reconfiguration fut ensuite renforcée, mais non créée, par le système électoral binominal chilien.

The configuration of the Chilean party system has changed significantly from before 1973 to the period since the mid-1980s, leading to an extremely stable political arena in the post-transition period. Chile's party system was characterized by a competitive dynamic between three ideological blocs along a wide left-right spectrum in 1958-1973. The new pattern is one of unequal competition between two large blocs on a reduced left-right spectrum. Two aspects are decisive here: the location of the borders between political institutional blocs & the system's new anchoring in a wide, center & left-of-center, portion of the political spectrum. The different strategies of struggle against Pinochet's rule gave rise to a major displacement of these borders, thus changing the relative strength of the system's blocs. This reconfiguration was reinforced but not created by the new binominal electoral system. Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Ostiguy, P. (1997). Peronismo y antiperonismo : bases socioculturales de la identidad política en la Argentina. Revista de ciencias sociales, (6), 133-215. ; Este articulo aborda el tema de la identidad política y el problema relacionado del modo de atraer y representar políticamente "gente" en la arena pública, para conseguir votos o, dicho de otra manera, para constituir y /o movilizar una base política. Se refiere por lo tanto a un aspecto central del comportamiento político, con respecto tanto a las preferencias electorales e identificaciones de los votantes, como a estrategias que usan o puedan usar los políticos en público y especialmente en campaña. Teóricamente, retoma de un cierto modo el ya histórico tema de origen althusseriano de la interpelación y delinea un espacio político de llamamientos, de apelaciones, que abarca, pero no limitándose a ello, el tradicional eje político izquierda-derecha. Basado en el caso de la Argentina, muestra el a veces insospechado pero inequívoco impacto de diferencias culturales de clase, y más precisamente socio-culturales, sobre la identidad política y el comportamiento electoral.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Series Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- Part I Theory -- 2 Populism, Hegemony, and the Political Construction of "The People": A Discursive Approach -- 3 Who Would Identify With An "Empty Signifier"?: The Relational, Performative Approach to Populism -- Part II Populist Identification in Global Perspective -- 4 Populism as Synecdochal Representation: Understanding the Transgressive Bodily Performance of South American Presidents -- 5 Rafael Correa and the Citizens' Revolution in Ecuador: A Case of Left-Wing Non-Hegemonic Populism -- 6 Trump and the Populist Presidency -- 7 Populism, Race, and Radical Imagination: #FeelingTheBern in the Age of #BlackLivesMatter -- 8 Populist Politics and the Politics of "Populism": The Radical Right in Western Europe -- 9 Populism in Government: The Case of SYRIZA (2015-2019) -- 10 The High-Low Divide in Turkish Politics and the Populist Appeal of Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party -- 11 Beyond Demagogues and Deplorables: Democratizing Populist Rhetoric in Rodrigo Duterte's Philippines -- 12 Out With the Old, In With the New?: The ANC and EFF's Battle to Represent the South African "People" -- 13 Conclusions: Reflections on the Lessons Learned -- Index.

Sur la base du péronisme en Argentine, on peut comprendre le populisme comme une révolte du bas, selon un clivage socioculturel. Le populisme est ainsi un discours vulgaire, nativiste, avec une tendance à la personnalisation.

There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N data sets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly twentieth-century Latin American phenomenon. Yet the cases of Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the twenty-first century. Focussing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites, while possibilities for democratisation are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilise the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.